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Abstract 
Good governance is recognized as a fundamental indicator of the 
success of a company. For a small- midsized company, this is 
particularly so, as such companies must be able to competitively 
demonstrate their flexibility in the face of market forces. This flexibility 
is the primary advantage they hold over larger firms (Dalton, Daily, 
Ellstrand and Johnson, 1998). 
 
Such companies, however, can find it difficult to attract good directors 
(Daum and Neff, 2003) and this makes developing improved strategies 
of governance a challenge. Taylor, Chait and Holland suggest top 
directors are not attracted to small/ medium companies because “the 
stakes remain low, the meetings process-driven, the outcomes 
ambiguous, and the deliberations insular” (Taylor, Chait and Holland, 
2001). We suggest that the attraction of quality directors is a uniquely 
impacting situation for small and mid-size firms, as it is there where 
additional management resources should be needed most urgently. 
 
Directors on the boards of small-medium sized businesses are often 
lagging behind directors of large companies in that they are less likely 
to be independent external directors and are less likely to represent a 
diversity of attributes (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand and Johnson, 1998). 
Arthur Levitt, former United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission Chair, describes the culture of medium sized business 
directorships as a “kind of a fraternity of CEOs who serve on one 
another's boards” (Stainburn, 2005). In addition, evidence suggests 
directors of small- medium businesses are often insufficiently trained 
for the role.  Uncertain directors may, for example, be unwilling to ask 
crucial questions of managers before making major decisions. “Board 
members sometimes are made to feel that asking a thorny question or 
advancing an alternative opinion is disloyal to the administration” 
(Taylor, Chait and Holland, 2001). 
 
Small and medium businesses, however, are a growing contributor to 
the national economies of countries internationally. In New Zealand, 
small and medium-size firms recording large GDP values, ahead of 
many large businesses, which makes our investigation into good 
governance practices of SMEs relevant to suggest areas in which these 
firms can improve their governance policies and practices. 
 
We have reviewed more than 2,000 directors, executives and investors 
in New Zealand, making this one of the largest non-government 
surveys in governance. Supported by 16 large corporate organizations, 
such as KPMG, Business New Zealand, Simpson Grierson, Brook Asset 
Management, Porter Novelli,  Sheffield and ‘Management’ Magazine, 
this work suggests that the current processes through which directors 
are selected and  trained to serve on Boards of small and medium 
businesses needs to be altered. We are also concerned over the lack of 
director education and the close involvement of the Chief Executives 
as members of the Boards. There is a general concern over the lack of 
director independence and whether directors are effective in their 
roles. 
 
We are recommending an alternative process for SMEs to select 
directors, which will hopefully expand the available pool of directors in 
quantity and quality. 
 
 
 
Overview 
 
Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) are the drivers of the economy 
in many countries, yet fall behind larger companies in the area of 
corporate governance (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand and Johnson, 1998).  
We believe that the focus on governance processes and policies has 
been incorrectly placed on the relatively few large globally active firms 
where extensive governance regimes are established and monitored, 
overlooking the large group of GDP-driving small and mid-size firms in 
each country. Likely, this top-down approach has tainted the 
discussion and created an environment where governance is largely an 
audit and compliance tool, rather than an accepted component of long-
term strategy for any sustainable business and warmly embraced by 
owners, operators and directors. 
 
The failing of large corporations in recent years (such as Enron) has 
brought the issue of corporate governance into prominence and boards 
are being asked to improve their performance (Nicholson and Kiel, 
2004). Due to the lack of financial and organizational resources, this 
call to arms for business operators of any size represents a new 
challenge, and we are wondering how executives, directors and 
investors will approach this opportunity to improve the leadership 
resources of their firms. 
The boards of smaller companies are far less likely to comprise 
independent outside directors (Daum and Neff, 2003; Stainburn, 
2005). SMEs can find attracting quality directors difficult, research 
suggests, because such directors tend to be repelled by the insularity 
of meeting procedures and the “low stakes” involved (Taylor, Chait 
and Holland, 2001). Whether it is the glamour of large corporations 
with the large compensation packages and the news headlines, or the 
ability to influence operating results on a large scale, smaller firms 
seem to have to work harder to attract quality directors. We have 
asked directors for the reasons of joining a smaller firm, and it is clear 
that remuneration and glitz are not very high motivators for directors 
in New Zealand (Mueller, Dana, Taylor and Maier, 2006). 
 
As you would imagine in smaller firms, people work closer together 
and in many cases the leadership also performs management tasks – 
and vice versa. In many firms the CEO is also a board member. In a 
smaller but still significant number of firms, the CEO is also the 
Chairperson of the board. This raises some obvious issues of 
independence and conflicts. How many CEOs, working closely with 
staff every day, can make tough staff layoff decisions without thinking 
about colleagues and friends? To what extent does a CEO vote for his 
own pay check and stature associated with the position, rather than 
for the shareholder interest (as a director would be obligated to do…). 
Notwithstanding the fact that many CEOs in smaller firms will also be 
shareholders and thus be expected to be aligned in their personal 
interests with those of their shareholders, we are mindful that a 
certain degree of schizophrenia is expected from CEOs who are 
expected to disassociate themselves from their day-to-day managerial 
duties when they enter the board room. Is this overlap of obligations 
helpful, or should board members all be independent, drawing on the 
CEOs expertise as a ‘consultant’ to the board, rather then being a full 
voting director? 
 
Most research indicates that Boards function best when the CEO is not 
also the Chair of the board (Standard and Poor, 2004; Damodoran, 
2004; Petra, 2005; Whitehead Mann Group, 2005). “Many CEOs don’t 
have the skills to be Chairman and certainly not in their own 
organisation, because they can’t let go” (Whitehead Mann Group, 
2005). Inexperienced directors can feel unconfident about talking 
thorny issues for fear of appearing disloyal (Taylor, Chait and Holland, 
2001). SME Boards tend to lack the diversity of skills and attributes to 
“enable companies to evaluate key strategic issues more fully and 
monitor their performance more effectively” (Henderson Global 
Investors, 2003). The training and induction of new directors is also a 
cause for concern among SME boards. Boards also need to be 
prepared to submit heir own performance, both as a whole and as 
individual directors, to self-analysis on a regular basis (Colin, 1994; 
Wilkes, 2004; Behan, 2004; Petra, 2005). The CEO of a smaller 
business may find it very difficult to step back enough to allow the 
Board to effectively function, and potential conflicts of interest can 
arise when the CEO is also the Chairperson of the Board (Petra, 2005). 
A CEO’s inability to let go makes them unsuitable candidates for 
chairship of their Boards as they do not always have the skills they 
need to overcome this and successfully guide the Board. (Whitehead 
Mann Group, 2005). The Chairperson should be able to run the Board 
rather than the organisation, have a positive working relationship with 
the CEO, and a clear separation of responsibilities (Whitehead Mann 
Group, 2005). 
 
Methodology 
 
With the help of an MBA team from the Waikato Management Schol, 
consisting of six international managers in the final months of their 
MBA program, we have developed an online survey 
(www.worldsurvey.info) with questions based on more than 100 of the 
most recent governance studies and academic reports in this area. To 
reach a widespread level of feedback, we developed questions suitable 
for company executives, corporate directors and investors and 
packaged all of those into one survey, mitigating confusion through 
clear separation of the three segments and instructions. The survey 
questions were reviewed and edited by leaders and executive staff of 
some of the most prominent firms, government departments and 
industry organizations in New Zealand, such as KPMG, Simpson 
Grierson, Business New Zealand, Brook Asset Management, Sheffield, 
Bank of New Zealand, Porter Novelli, NZ Venture Capital Assn, Crown 
Company Monitoring Advisory Unit, Business New Zealand, New 
Zealand Shareholders Association, New Zealand Institute of Chartered 
Accountants, New Zealand Institute of Management, several Chambers 
of Commerce and Management Magazine. This group represents one 
of the largest collectives of leaders and corporations ever in New 
Zealand to investigate the status of governance. In addition to editing 
and editorial guidance, all of these supporters distributed an e-mail 
with the link to the survey to their respective client mailing lists. We 
have reviewed more than 2,000 responses to this ongoing survey to 
date, from directors, executives and investors. 
 
The survey results were received anonymously, with some of the 
respondents completing all sections of the survey (executives, 
directors, investors), and others only completing the parts which 
applied to them. The survey has sensitive branching sections which 
only showed pages with questions applicable to the specific 
respondent. 
 
The survey was also described on a daily morning business show on 
the largest TV station in the country and had long write-ups in national 
business magazines (Management Magazine and Director Magazine), 
business sections of daily news papers and industry magazines, further 
encouraging participation and creating a compelling call to participate. 
 
We conclude that this is a representative sample of New Zealand 
business, without material bias as to geographic location, industry, 
size or other key demographics. 
 
 
Results 
 
We take notice of the fact that nearly 39% of respondents were 
women, as that indicates a reasonable participation of women, who 
are underpresented as leaders of business organizations in New 
Zealand but seem to be better represented as members of a 
management team and as investors. 
 
With 75% of the respondents requesting a copy of the summary report 
and 63% of the respondents volunteering to make additional 1-on-1 
time available on the telephone to discuss their thoughts about 
governance, this topic clearly is of more than just passing interest. We 
believe this high level of interest in the topic, beyond the simple 
completion of a survey, indicates the importance of this discussion, 
and since 72% of the respondents were from small and mid-size firms, 
this issue has certainly now penetrated the business community 
beyond the large, publicly listed firms. 
 
Possibly as a reflection of the large number of small and mid-size firms 
in this sample comes the report that 50% of the firms have no 
independent directors. Nam and Nam point out that a Board will 
function best where there is a good spread of inside/executive and 
outside/independent directors in order to provide objective judgments 
of managerial performance (Nam and Nam, 2004), and it is by now 
well documented that independent directors are favoured by investors 
and regulatory agencies worldwide. Independent directors can likely 
not be recruited with traditional means. As a CEO or as a board 
director, the tendency in recruiting a new director is often to focus on 
individuals where there is an existing personal relationship or on the 
stature of the candidate (Conger and Lawler, 2001), and this inward-
looking approach likely excludes competent independent directors. 
Arthur Levitt, former United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission Chair, describes the culture of medium sized business 
directorships as a “kind of a fraternity of CEOs who serve on one 
another's boards” (Stainburn, 2005), something that may enable less 
effective monitoring (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999).   
A search process that is rigorous and takes in a wider range of possible 
candidates can offer SMEs access to directors with greater diversity in 
“background, experience, age, gender, ethnicity and nationality” 
(London Business School, 2003). Nominating committees comprising 
such independent NEDs are more likely to nominate NDEs to the Board 
who will challenge the decisions of the CEO (Shivdasani and Yermack, 
1998), and we can confirm that investors are interested in directors 
who can vigorously debate issues at board level.  
The call for more independent directors seems to have been heard 
loud and clear by the business community in New Zealand. In this 
study alone, respondents have indicated a need for more than 2,200 
independent directors over the next five years, placing the total 
number of directors needed in New Zealand at much more than 
10,000. This raises the issue how those directors are recruited, and 
where executives and their investors can find qualified directors to 
take on this important role. 
 
For SME Boards, there may soon be no choice but to introduce 
improvements to the standard of governance. The pressure on Boards 
to improve their corporate performance and the ways in which they 
oversee the company’s management has led to what Nicholson and 
Kiel describe as “a series of inquiries and reports” advocating 
corporate governance reform (Nicholson and Kiel, 2004). 
 
For a SME, the task of selecting independent directors becomes crucial 
to the credibility of the company, and we will propose alternate ways 
for SMEs to identify suitable new directors.  
 
What makes these high quality directors join a Board? 
Taylor, Chait and Holland suggest top directors are not attracted to 
small/ medium companies because “the stakes remain low, the 
meetings process-driven, the outcomes ambiguous, and the 
deliberations insular” (Taylor, Chait and Holland, 2001), and this raises 
concerns over how expectations of directors can be met by firms. 
We now know from our work that it is not the money or the prestige 
associated with serving as a director of a publicly listed firm. Potential 
directors want to ‘do some good’, and presumably want to be able to 
use their talents to help shape the firm towards achieving better 
performance. They also are very concerned about the level of personal 
risk attached to their directorship position. The backdrop for this level 
of importance could be the more stringent personal liability risks for 
directors in New Zealand than in many other industrialized countries, 
and we speculate that firms with an interest in new independent 
director will need to demonstrate stable financial performance with a 
high degree of transparency and accountability – and access to 
director liability insurance. 
 
Of greater concern to us is the reflection of 66% of our respondents 
that the reputation of the fellow directors is ‘very important’ to them 
(Graph 1). This raises the issue of how firms create diverse boards, 
bringing in new independent directors, if these new candidates use the 
existing make-up of the board as one of their key determinants for 
participation. Clearly, investors, executives and directors must begin 
to craft a board which is not only effective internally, but also signals 
to the pool of prospective directors outside an attractive environment 
created through reputable directors. 
  
Graph 1: If you were offered a Board position now, how important 
would each of the following factors be for you? 
 
 
 
 
Where can we find these thousands of newly needed directors? 
It has been advocated that a board of directors is the best bargain in 
modern business because it represents a cadre of expert consultants 
to management, with a level of talent and experience the company 
could never hire on a per diem basis (Charles and Caroline, 2003), and 
many small business owners will agree that consultants can be 
horrendously expensive and may not easily be available to smaller and 
less visible firms. If directors might now be available with a motivation 
other than of pure income, business leaders and investors might be 
able to re-position their needs and objectives to merge their long-term 
interests of achievement with those of prospective directors. The 
process of assembling the right mix requires a disciplined approach 
involving a careful assessment of the needs and challenges of the 
company (Charles and Caroline, 2003; London Business School, 2003) 
and this includes demonstrating to stakeholders that the company is 
committed to a rigorous selection process (London Business School, 
2003).  “Sharing information with shareholders, employees and other 
customers demonstrating that a company is committed to such a 
selection process is likely to foster greater trust in its NED 
appointments” (London Business School, 2003). We know from our 
work that the current selection process is primarily centered around 
recruiting friends and colleagues, rather than opening the funnel wide 
for the exposure to new categories and talents of directors. 
Diversity and independence of the company are agreed key 
considerations in appointing a good mix of directors (Henderson Global 
Investors, 2003; Petra, 2005; London Business School, 2003; Nam 
and Nam, 2004), but there is less accord over what qualities the 
individual director should have. For some researchers, the ideal 
candidate will be a proven leader who has already addressed the kinds 
of issues the company is facing and will have financial acumen 
(Charles and Caroline, 2003; Petra 2005) while others say/believe a 
diversity of candidates, including those without a business background, 
bring with them different perspectives to apply to business problems 
and “enable companies to evaluate key strategic issues more fully and 
monitor their performance more effectively” (Henderson Global 
Investors, 2003; Taylor, Chait and Holland, 1996). Petra notes the 
recommendation that that the mix of talents and skills required be set 
down in writing in advance of appointing directors and include 
“business, finance, accounting, marketing, public policy, 
manufacturing and operations, government, technology, and other 
areas the board deems desirable” (Petra, 2005). Nicholson and Kiel 
point out that corporate governance will rarely be a function of one 
component (such as social capital or human capital) and the challenge 
for a Board arises from its understanding of the roles required and its 
ability to match the intellectual capital of the board to those roles 
(Nicholson and Kiel, 2004). 
We are concerned that in our population of directors in New Zealand, a 
large number of those directors (60%) learned of directorship 
openings through other directors (Graph 2), or were large 
shareholders themselves (32%) or one of the founders (34%). 
Although the debate over the suitability of founders and shareholders 
to also be effective directors is far from over, it is clearly restrictive 
that the vast majority of directorship positions are ‘marketed’ through 
the existing directors. This may very well tap into the diverse and rich 
network of professional friends and colleagues who otherwise might 
not respond to invitations from strangers, but it begs the question 
whether the recruitment of new directors through existing directors 
gives the firm access to the talent set it needs. 
 
Early indications from our continuing work are that there is a large 
differential of competence between directors on the same board, and 
we wonder if the new directors are recruited more for their 
compatibility with existing directors than for their demonstrated 
competence. In the best case, this recruitment process yields directors 
of good compentence and similar reputation. In the worst case, this 
process restricts the addition of directors which might not ‘fit’ for other 
than competence reasons. 
 
 
Graph 2: How did you hear about openings for directorships? 
 
 
Assembling the right mix of directors is the key to ensuring good 
governance (Charles and Caroline, 2003; Conger and Lawler, 2001; 
London Business School, 2003; Nicholson and Kiel, 2004). Knowing 
the appropriate mix of directors is not necessarily a matter of best 
practice, but depends on the needs of the particular Board (Felton and 
Watson, 2002; Nichols and Kiel, 2004). Felton and Watson describe 
the process as not a “ ‘checklist’ of the ten best practices” but a “state 
of mind – a considered balance between the need for the board to 
represent shareholder interests and the need to ensure management 
feels sufficiently free to focus on value creation” (Felton and Watson, 
2002). In our sample, industry experience and a professional legal 
background scored low with investors. Investors want individuals as 
representatives with proven, preferably international, business 
accomplishments, which experience from outside the industry and 
diversity to the board table. Directors who sit on many boards are less 
likely to win investor votes than those who bring a fresh perspective to 
the party, focused more on long-term strategic planning than on 
compliance policing. 
 
  
 
 
Summary 
"In the final analysis, it is our view that the best boards comprise high 
quality, committed, independent directors; every board has room for 
more of these types of directors" (Felton and Watson, 2002).  
 
Our work has shown that thousands of new directors are needed in 
New Zealand over the next five years, and investors are predominantly 
looking for independent directors with a proven track record outside 
the industry, creating a diverse board. Directors are also considering 
the reputations of the existing board and their own personal level of 
risk, before they commit to a directorship where they largely wish to 
‘do some good’. 
 
We are left with the conclusion that the selection process for directors 
in New Zealand is inadequate to supply these thousands of 
independent directors, many of which would likely not have served as 
directors before and might be well-performing executives in other 
firms. There is a need for a ‘market’ where prospective directors and 
firms’ investors and boards can ‘meet’, to connect and recruit. We 
propose that the Directions work in several countries can establish 
criteria which may guide investors and executives in  their search for 
directors, and that we can establish a globally valid benchmark score 
which can easily compare governance accomplishments across 
borders. 
 
 
 
Note to readers: We are looking for interested academics and 
institutions who wish to be the research leaders for this work in their 
countries. Please contact the author at m@usainfo.net for more 
details. 
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